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The Syrian Baath Party and Sunni Islam: 
Conflicts and Connivance
Dr. Thomas Pierret
In the first weeks of the Syrian uprising that began in March 2011, religious symbols and figures rapidly emerged as 
important components of the movement. Allah Akbar (“God is 
the Greatest”) was often shouted, along with liberal slogans like 
“God, Syria, Freedom, and that’s it!” Certain Muslim scholars 
or ulama became iconic figures of the protests, and many 
demonstrations took place in and around mosques, which 
offered some degree of protection from security forces. With the 
gradual radicalization of the uprising in the months since, and 
the consequently greater presence of Islamist armed groups, 
religion came to occupy an increasingly central place in the 
rhetoric of the opposition.
Religion is also key to understanding the Syrian conflict to the extent that the 
issue of religious—or, more precisely, sectarian—identity has been at the heart 
of Syria’s domestic tensions for decades. Although Sunni Muslims probably 
account for 80 percent of the country’s population, members of President 
Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite sect, which accounts for only 10 percent, have 
dominated the military, and hence the regime, from the 1960s on. By 2011, it 
was estimated that a majority of the officers in the army and the intelligence 
apparatus were Alawites, as were most of the rank and file in elite units such 
as the Republican Guard and the 4th Armored Division. 
In this Brief, I address the issue of sectarianism in Syria by analyzing the 
history of the relationship between the regime and the Sunni Islamic 
community: to the Islamist opposition movements, on the one hand, and 
the ulama (the learned religious elite), on the other. (I will highlight the 
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specificities of the Syrian case but also point out the resemblance of the Syrian 
situation to that of other states in the region.) I discuss the regime’s partnership 
with foreign Shia actors and the resentment that has generated among 
Syrian Sunnis, as well as the role of economic liberalization in the post-2000 
rapprochement between the regime, the ulama, and the Sunni bourgeoisie at large. 
On that basis, I will analyze the stance adopted by Sunni religious actors since the 
outbreak of the current uprising.1
The Eradication of Political Islam
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, established in 1946, made its debut in the 
context of a parliamentary democracy. Although at that time, notables (belonging 
to the landed and merchant elites) dominated the political system, the Islamists 
nevertheless managed to secure a few seats in the assembly in the elections of 
1949 and 1962 as well as ministerial portfolios. The Brotherhood had another 
good reason to be loyal to the parliamentary system: This system’s main enemy—
that is, the military—which regularly intervened in Syrian political life from 
1949 on, was heavily influenced by the founder of the Turkish Republic Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk’s experience of authoritarian secularization. As for the Egyptian 
president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who from 1958 to 1961 ruled over Syria as a result 
of the latter’s merger with Egypt into the short-lived United Arab Republic, he 
marginalized the Brotherhood in Syria along with any ideological party that might 
overshadow him. 
In 1963, two years after Syria’s return to parliamentary life as a result of its 
secession from the United Arab Republic, the Baathist coup put a definitive 
end to the country’s democratic experience. The Brotherhood was now at odds 
with the new masters of the country not only ideologically—since the secularist 
enthusiasm of the Baath was at its apex in the mid-1960s—but also socially and 
sectarianly. Whereas the new regime’s strongmen were often sons of peasants 
from heterodox Muslim minorities (Druzes, Ismailis, and Alawites), the Muslim 
Brotherhood was strongly rooted in the urban Sunni middle class.
Following the Baathist coup of 1963, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood continued 
to operate in a semi-underground fashion; but by the mid-1960s, the organization 
was bled dry by the self-imposed exile of hundreds of its members to Gulf 
monarchies. In the 1970s, however, in a context of a looming Islamic revival 
throughout the region, they took advantage of the very limited liberalization 
initiated by Hafez al-Assad to rebuild their forces in a semi-clandestine fashion. 
This development coincided with the emergence of a militant current advocating 
the abandonment of the Brotherhood’s educational strategy in favor of armed 
struggle—which in turn gave rise to the Fighting Vanguard, a breakaway 
faction that at the end of the decade launched a campaign of assassinations and 
bomb attacks against the regime. By early 1980, northern cities like Aleppo and 
Hama had witnessed broad protest movements involving students, professional 
associations, and the merchant bourgeoisie.
The regime responded to this predominantly urban uprising with military 
operations that culminated with the 1982 siege of the rebel stronghold of Hama, 
which led to the death of thousands and the destruction of the city’s old center. 
Assad’s ability to defeat the insurgency came about as a result of the loyalty of the 
Alawite community along with the passivity of Sunni peasants, many of whom 
had benefited from the regime’s agrarian policies. Limited economic liberalization 
3in the 1970s had also entailed a rapprochement between 
Assad and the Damascene bourgeoisie, which helped Assad 
circumvent dissent in the capital.
In the meantime, the regime had put an end to the presence 
of the Muslim Brotherhood inside the country. In 1980, 
with the promulgation of Law No. 49, mere membership 
in the organization was made punishable by death. In 
the following years, the gradual annihilation of Islamist 
networks in the country resulted in a new generation of 
exiles swelling the ranks of the Syrian Islamist diaspora in 
the Middle East and Europe. From then on, this diaspora 
became the only real sphere of operations for the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood, which was now no more than a 
movement of exiles run by aging figures. Secret talks 
between the Brotherhood and the regime took place from 
the late 1980s on, but the latter offered only individual 
amnesties and never indicated any intention of allowing 
the reintegration of the Brotherhood into the political 
game.
Despite this intransigence, some Islamic-leaning 
intellectuals based in Syria hoped that the major foreign 
policy crises of the 2000s (the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon two years later) would 
encourage the regime to authorize the creation of moderate 
Islamist parties inspired by the Turkish AKP. These hopes 
were dashed, however, by the indefinite postponement of 
a projected new law providing for a genuine multi-party 
system.
In an interview in 2006, Muhammad Habash, one of the 
few Islamic-leaning members of the Syrian Parliament 
and an outspoken advocate of the authorization of 
“faith-based” parties, summed up the problem this way: 
“Baathist ideology does not have a problem with Islam, 
it has a problem with liberalism, because embracing the 
latter would mean that the Baath party has to renounce 
its constitutional role as the “leading party in society and 
state,” and that religion and state should be separated.”2 
Indeed, the regime has had little difficulty establishing 
partnerships with conservative Muslim scholars whose 
views were far more opposed to Baathist ideology than 
the Brotherhood’s moderate Islamism and the AKP 
admirers’ “Muslim democrat” approach. From the regime’s 
viewpoint, however, conservative Muslim scholars had the 
advantage of focusing on the defense of narrowly defined 
sectoral interests (religious education, public morality) 
rather than demanding democratic reforms.
Relations with the Sunni Ulama
The Syrian Baathist regime’s management of Sunni 
religious institutions has been more distinctly 
idiosyncratic than its relationship with the political 
Islamic opposition. Between independence in 1946 and 
1963, Syrian governments adopted an approach similar 
to that of Kemalist Turkey and Nasserite Egypt: They 
“nationalized” religious institutions. The state built up 
legal and administrative structures (creation of a position 
of Grand Mufti, establishment of a Ministry of Religious 
Endowments [awqaf] in charge of religious affairs); actively 
participated in the modernization of higher religious 
education (opening of a Faculty of Sharia at the University 
of Damascus); and even tried to impose a uniform on 
Muslim clerics, detailed down to the color of their socks!
After 1963, the Baath rapidly broke with that model by 
shifting away from institution building and focusing on the 
political neutralization of the Sunni religious elite. Rather 
than incorporating the latter into the state bureaucracy, 
as Nasser had done in Egypt, the new Syrian regime opted 
for a policy of exclusion, by depriving the vast majority of 
the grand ulama from any responsibility in the religious 
administration. Moreover, that bureaucracy did not 
undergo the expansion enjoyed by other state agencies in 
the now socialist state, and private Islamic seminaries were 
among the few exceptions to the nationalization of schools 
that the regime effected at the end of the 1960s.
The religious policies of the Baathist regime were driven 
by two main considerations. On an ideological level, the 
secularist revolutionaries in power were reluctant to use 
state resources to the benefit of a reactionary religious 
establishment that many in the party assumed was doomed 
to disappear in any case. In terms of political strategy, the 
ruling team did not wish to open the gates of the state 
apparatus to an inherently hostile conservative religious 
elite.
Instead of encouraging the regime to rethink this approach, 
the Islamist insurgency of 1979-82 only radicalized it 
further. The state religious bureaucracy, now perceived as 
a threat rather than employed as an instrument of control, 
lost no less than two-thirds of its staff during the 1980s and 
1990s. The establishment of the Assad Institutes for the 
Memorization of the Quran was in fact a mere relabeling of 
pre-existing, mosque-based informal study circles. As for 
the expansion of higher Islamic education in response to a 
growing social demand, it was entrusted to new institutes 
run by pro-regime clerics, like Grand Mufti Ahmad 
Kaftaro, but remained entirely private from both legal and 
financial points of view.
4The 1979–82 uprising also led to the establishment of an 
unlikely alliance between the regime and a prestigious 
Sunni religious figure, the dean of the Faculty of Sharia, 
Sa‘id Ramadan al-Buti. Al-Buti was radically hostile to 
the pillars of Baathist ideology—that is, nationalism and 
socialism—which he had denounced in several of his 
widely read books. At the same time, his arch-conservative 
understanding of Sunni political theology included 
advocating absolute obedience to political authority, 
regardless of its (many) flaws, on the basis that tyranny 
is preferable to “discord” (fitna); but it was also justified 
by the belief that dialogue with the government was the 
surest path to eventually achieving clerical goals.
And indeed, from the mid-1990s on, the regime gradually 
lifted severe restrictions on basic religious practices, 
such as wearing headscarves in schools, holding religious 
lessons in mosques, and celebrating the Prophet’s 
birthday. During the next decade, the new president, 
Bashar al-Assad, while turning a deaf ear to the Islamist 
parties’ demands for political inclusion, was increasingly 
receptive to the demands of the ulama as a means of 
securing their support in the context of multiple regional 
crises (the U.S. occupation of Iraq; Syria’s withdrawal 
from Lebanon). Reaching out to former enemies—some of 
them freshly returned from exile, like leaders of the Zayd 
movement Osama and Sariya al-Rifa‘i—Bashar allowed 
them to expand informal networks of religious education, 
while the number of charities and Islamic secondary 
schools skyrocketed.
Assad’s conciliatory strategy did not produce the desired 
outcome, however, as the Sunni religious elite’s retrieved 
self-confidence rapidly proved embarrassing. Of course, 
no one dared attack the President himself, and even 
traditionally independent figures exhibited a readiness 
to praise Assad’s anti-American and anti-Israeli stance. 
But the ulama did feel strong enough to launch rhetorical 
offensives against secularist elements within state 
agencies like the ministries of Media and Education. In 
2006, in response to the Ministry of Education’s decision 
to abolish the preparatory level (first three years) of 
Sharia high schools and institutes in order to extend the 
compulsory core curriculum of general education, forty 
of the country’s most famous Muslim scholars sent Assad 
a petition condemning a “conspiracy” fomented by the 
Ministry of Education in order to “destroy religion.”
In the face of such wayward clerical behavior, the 
regime started to look for an alternative to its policy of 
relative lenience toward the ulama. The opportunity to 
change course arose in 2008, when Syria’s foreign policy 
successes (the victory of pro-Syrian militias in the May 
2008 clashes in Beirut; Assad’s official visit to Paris in 
July) relieved the regime of the need to seek the support 
of the ulama. Combined with a deadly terrorist attack 
in September that was attributed to Islamic militants, 
that context paved the way for an ambitious program 
of reforms, which aimed to significantly increase the 
role and resources of the state religious bureaucracy, 
particularly through the partial nationalization of private 
Islamic seminaries. These measures were accompanied by 
a revival of the regime’s secularist ambitions, as evidenced 
by the closing of prayer halls in shopping malls, the ban 
on face veils (niqab) in universities, the transfer of face-
veiled schoolteachers to administrative positions, and the 
prohibition against displaying signs of sectarian affiliation 
on cars. As a result, on the eve of the uprising of 2011, 
relations between the regime and the Sunni religious elite 
had considerably deteriorated, not only because of the 
2008 crackdown but also because of growing rumors of 
Shiite missionary activities in the country.
The Shiite Presence
Of all the issues discussed above, the Syrian state’s 
relationship to Shiite Islam is undoubtedly the most 
directly related to the Alawite affiliation of the regime’s 
strongmen. Despite a distant common origin, clerics 
belonging to Twelver Shia Islam—that is, the mainstream 
brand of Shiism, predominantly found today in Iran and 
Iraq—long looked upon the secretive doctrines of the 
Alawites, and in particular their reported deification 
of Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, Ali, as 
nothing but heresy, and many still do. Only in the first half 
of the twentieth century did reformist Alawite scholars 
make serious efforts to foster doctrinal rapprochement 
with Twelver Shiism. As for the Baathist regime, its 
partnership with Twelver Shiism started after Hafez al-
Assad’s coming to power in 1970.
As the first non-Sunni president of a country whose 
constitution requires that the head of state be a Muslim, 
Assad sought fatwas affirming the Alawites’ affiliation 
with Islam. He never obtained such fatwas from Syrian 
Sunni clerics, even the most obsequious among them, 
but rather from foreign Twelver Shia scholars who were 
indebted to him for political reasons: Hasan al-Shirazi, 
an Iraqi opponent who sought refuge in Syria, and Musa 
al-Sadr, the founder of the Syrian-sponsored Lebanese 
Amal movement. Assad’s network of Shia partners vastly 
expanded after 1979 when he established a strategic 
alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Lebanese 
extension, Hezbollah.3
Thanks to their excellent relations with the Syrian regime, 
various foreign Twelver Shia networks were allowed to 
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of Sayyida Zaynab. They also rebuilt, at great expense 
and according to the canons of Persian architecture, the 
shrines of key figures of Shia hagiography, such as the 
Prophet’s relatives Sayyida Zaynab and Sayyida Ruqqaya 
in Damascus, and the Companions Ammar bin Yasir and 
Uways al-Qarni in the north central city of al-Raqqa. By 
2011, these sites had been visited by hundreds of thousands 
of foreign Shia pilgrims every year.
Early on, Shia institutions in Syria were suspected of 
working for the conversion of Sunnis, a goal some Shia 
clerics were in fact not really trying to conceal. Although 
they did not achieve significant success in that endeavor, 
individual—and, in one village of the Euphrates valley, 
collective—conversions grabbed people’s attention. 
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, anti-
Shia resentment spread among Sunni Syrians, along with 
rumors of “Shiitization” (tashayyu‘) in the country. The 
regional context—a Sunni-Shia civil war in Iraq and 
looming sectarian tensions in Lebanon—provided fertile 
ground for such apprehensions. They were fed, as well, 
by propaganda efforts on the part of both radical and 
moderate Syrian Islamist opponents and other enemies 
of Assad in the region. Anxiety in the face of Shiite 
activities was such that even a loyal regime ally like Dr. 
al-Buti dedicated a Friday sermon to denouncing the 
Syrian authorities’ permissiveness with respect to Shia 
missionaries.
The Consequences of Economic 
Liberalization
Regardless of the tensions generated by the post-2008 
crackdown and by rumors of Shiitization, the partnership 
between the regime and the ulama was being structurally 
consolidated as a result of the process of economic 
liberalization that had accelerated earlier in the decade. 
Although the “opening” (infitah) of the Syrian economy—
meaning opening it to private investment—formally 
started in the 1970s, it remained extremely limited until 
the rule of Bashar al-Assad. Under his aegis, the Syrian 
economy officially moved from socialism to a “social 
market economy,” and experienced such radical changes 
as the launching of private banks and the establishment 
of a legal framework aimed at stimulating foreign direct 
investment.
Although economic liberalization and the post-2003 
oil boom primarily enriched a handful of regime cronies 
(such as Assad’s cousin Rami Makhlouf), it also benefited 
businessmen of lower standing—including the small- and 
medium-sized “pious bourgeoisie,” along with members 
of old merchant families who had traditionally provided 
the ulama with the resources required to sustain their 
mosques, seminaries, and charities. Donations to religious 
institutions thus skyrocketed after 2003 because of the 
oil boom and economic liberalization, and also increased 
as a result of the support of regime cronies trying to 
buy themselves some respectability. Such was the case, 
for example, with respect to Muhammad Hamshu, the 
brother-in-law of Bashar al-Assad’s brother Mahir and 
an “independent” member of Parliament (meaning, non-
affiliated with the Baath or one of its satellite parties). 
Hamshu spent millions of pounds in support of religious 
activities, and many ulama reciprocated the favor by 
supporting him during his electoral campaigns.
Economic liberalization also benefited the ulama by 
giving some of them a prominent role in newly founded 
Islamic banks. The Sharia boards of these banks recruited 
prestigious religious figures as well as experts in Islamic 
finance in order to appeal to potential customers. In 
the end, therefore, the neo-liberal turn in the economy 
strengthened the ulama’s relationship with Syrian 
economic elites and, through the latter, with the political 
and military establishment.
Sunni Islam and the 2011 uprising
As a result of the contradictory dynamics discussed above, 
the Sunni elites in Syria did not react to the 2011 crisis in 
a unified fashion. Whereas the Muslim Brotherhood and 
other Islamist opponents unsurprisingly lent full support 
to a movement that offered an opportunity to finally break 
the Baath’s monopoly on state power, the ulama were 
divided.
Long-standing allies of the regime, such as Grand Mufti 
Ahmad Hassun as well as al-Buti, put aside the grievances 
provoked by the regime’s recent “anti-religious” policies: 
Being deeply involved in the incumbent system, they 
had much to lose from Assad’s disappearance. Al-
Buti immediately denounced the protest as a foreign 
conspiracy and went so far as to praise the Syrian military 
at a time when it was already responsible for the deaths of 
thousands of civilians. Al-Buti died in a bomb attack while 
giving a mosque lesson in March 2013. Very few scholars 
were as vocal as al-Buti in their support for the regime, but 
many merely warned against “discord” or took refuge in 
silence.
On the other side of the struggle, revolutionary ulama first 
emerged in secondary cities that were in the forefront 
of the uprising, such as Daraa in the south, Homs in the 
center, and Banias on the coast. In Damascus and Aleppo, 
which witnessed only limited demonstrations during 
the first months of the uprising, Friday preachers were 
6considerably more measured in their rhetoric; but some of 
them nevertheless stood out as particularly outspoken, and 
consequently attracted anti-regime crowds. In the capital, 
the mosques of two of the city’s most respected scholars, 
Osama al-Rifa‘i and Krayyim Rajih, served as a starting 
points for several demonstrations. Although they did not 
initially call for the overthrow of Assad, these preachers 
totally rejected the regime narrative of the uprising (which 
attributed it to “armed gangs” remote-controlled from 
abroad); asserted the legitimacy of democratic demands; 
and blamed the police for the violence. Unsurprisingly, 
such challenges to the state generally came from former 
opponents (al-Rifa‘i had spent fifteen years in exile) who 
had reconciled with the regime only recently, and had 
subsequently maintained ambiguous relations with the 
authorities.
After five months of hesitation, the regime cracked down 
on Damascus’ rebellious preachers. After these preachers’ 
fierce criticism of the army’s intervention in the cities of 
Hama and Deir ez-Zor, dissenter ulama were banned from 
preaching, and al-Rifa‘i was even physically assaulted 
by regime thugs. Many expected that this sacrilegious 
aggression against an immensely respected religious 
scholar would trigger outraged protest that would shatter 
the regime’s control over Damascus. Yet, surprisingly, 
very little happened: Demonstrations were witnessed in 
the populous suburbs of the capital, which were already 
revolutionary strongholds, but downtown Damascus 
remained calm, even though the affluent neighborhoods 
of the city center were home to the majority of al-Rifa‘i’s 
followers. The sheikh’s most enthusiastic supporters did 
not hide their feeling of betrayal in light of the passivity of 
those who, but a few days before, were still thronging to 
kiss the hand of their spiritual leader.
What this episode revealed was the importance of 
social and economic factors in the uprising. The protest 
movement was clearly dominated by the losers from 
economic reforms, such as peasants who felt abandoned 
by the once socialist regime and inhabitants of the cities’ 
lower-class suburbs. The ulama belonged to the “other 
Syria”—that is, to that part of society that had thrived as a 
result of liberalization. Those among them who supported 
the revolt out of conviction were forced to acknowledge 
that they were receiving little, if any, support from most of 
their wealthy followers. 
Class interest thus accounted for the (at least passive) 
loyalty to the regime exhibited by the Sunni bourgeoisie 
of Damascus and Aleppo. But the situation changed 
significantly in the late spring of 2012. Merchant strikes 
were witnessed in Damascus for the first time, and rumor 
had it that Bashar al-Assad had threatened prominent 
members of the merchant community that he would 
“break the old souk over their heads.” It was in this context 
of deteriorating relations between the state and the 
bourgeoisie that many first-rank Damascene ulama decided 
to go into exile, and to openly embrace the revolutionary 
cause. Among them were Osama al-Rifa‘i and Krayyim 
Rajih as well as the extraordinarily popular radio preacher 
Ratib al-Nabulsi. The latter explained that he had refrained 
until then from openly voicing his opposition to the regime 
because Syrian society was divided—and in particular 
because of the neutral stance adopted by the wealthy. 
Things had changed, he claimed, as society was now united 
in its opposition to Assad.4
Conclusion
The deadly battles witnessed in Damascus and 
Aleppo from the summer of 2012 on had contradictory 
consequences with respect to the political stance of 
Sunni economic elites. On the one hand, these events 
demonstrated that Bashar al-Assad was unable to maintain 
security in major urban centers, and that he was ready 
to turn them into rubble rather than lose them to the 
insurgents; a very large share of the country’s business 
community consequently decided to relocate its activities 
abroad, particularly in Egypt. On the other hand, military 
developments showed that the rebels were unable to defeat 
the regime in its urban strongholds, and that even if they 
eventually proved able to do this, it would be at the price 
of the complete destruction of those cities. In Aleppo, 
moreover, the deep social divide between city dwellers 
and the predominantly peasant rebellion made many of the 
former anxious about the possibility of a rebel victory. 
By the summer of 2012, the continuation of Assad’s control 
over major urban centers had ceased to be a reflection 
of the popular support he had possibly enjoyed there. 
Increasingly, that control was the result of nothing more 
than brute military force, whose ever-growing use was 
made possible both by the recruitment of Alawite sectarian 
militias, which formed the basis of the National Defense 
Army established in early 2013, and by the support of 
Shia foreign fighters from the Lebanese Hezbollah and the 
multinational Abu al-Fadl al-‘Abbas Brigade. The regime’s 
apparent inability to recruit any significant number of new 
Sunni soldiers was probably the best proof that sectarian 
polarization had destroyed Assad’s pretentions to be able 
to exert a genuinely trans-sectarian leadership.
The standing of pre-2011 Sunni elites, too, had been 
irreparably damaged in the meantime. For decades, the 
urban Sunni middle and upper classes had provided 
both the most influential partners and foes of the regime 
from among Syrian society, be they ulama, businessmen, 
7or Islamic activists. After the uprising began, the role of these actors was at times 
visible, but never decisive. The long-suppressed Muslim Brotherhood took the lead 
with respect to the opposition’s efforts abroad, and leading ulama who in the past had 
already expressed their discontent with the regime’s crackdown on religious activities 
and tolerance for Shia proselytizing expressed support for demonstrators; but neither of 
these actors was a driving force behind a largely peripheral, lower-class uprising.
On the other side, Muslim scholars who had been more tightly coopted by the regime, 
along with much of the business class, helped hinder the spread of the protests in 
Damascus and Aleppo. But by 2013, the extreme level of militarization of the conflict 
had made such (dwindling) support a negligible factor in the survival of the regime. The 
war was now between the regime and new Sunni elites of an entirely different kind—
that is, Islamist rebel leaders of rural and suburban origin. Thus, by early 2014, although 
the military stalemate had made the success of Syria’s political revolution more 
uncertain than ever, the conflict had already brought about the deepest social upheaval 
in the country since the Baath’s “revolution from above” in the 1960s.5
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